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Abstract. Since Mid 1980s, a number of governments in developing countries initialized an ambitious decentralization policy
and other policies to strengthen local governments. Nevertheless, after more or less 25 years of their implementations, the
initial enthusiasm decreases. The experience in some countries shows that reform policy can trigger many new political, fiscal,
and administration problems.The article shortly describes seven major problems and potential traps lurking in decentralization
policy, consisting: policy trap, coordination trap, fiscal trap, debt trap, capturing trap, inequality trap, and capacity trap. The
evidence presented in this article has shown that decentralization can be part of a strategy to improve the capability and effectiveness of the state. It encompasses mechanisms that increase openness and transparency, strengthen incentives forparticipation in public affairs, and where appropriate, bring government closer to the people and to the communities it is meant to serve.
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Since the mid-1980s, a great number of governments
in developing countries have embarked on ambitious
decentralization policies and policies for strengthening
local government. As an essential part of public sector
modernization, initial expectations were high: decentralization and strengthening local governments was intended
to bring about a variety of improvements, particularly in
terms of political integration and participation, and the
provision of public services (Pollitt, 2005).
However, after some 25 years of implementing decentralization policies, initial enthusiasm has waned. In many
cases, decentralization that occurred did not result from
a carefully designed sequence of reforms, but occurred
in politically volatile environments where levels of trust
were low and policymakers responded largely ad-hoc and
unsystematically to the emerging demands from citizens,
local interest groups and donors (cf. Smoke et al. 2006).
While decentralization has, indeed, brought about a
variety of improvements around the world, most prominently
in primary and secondary education (Hansen, 1997; Faguet
and Sánchez, 2008), the overall outcome of decentralization appears to be mixed. Experience in some countries
suggests that reform policies can lead to a variety of new
political, fiscal and administrative problems.This article
will briefly examine seven major problems and potential
traps lurking in decentralization policy.
At this point it would be appropriate to stress, even at
the risk of some repetition, that decentralization, despite
Harald Fuhr is Professor and Chair of International Politics at the University of Potsdam, Germany. This article is based on a summary of
previous publications on the subject (Fuhr 1999, 2005, Campbell and
Fuhr 2004, World Bank 1997), yet more from a policy-oriented perspective. It sets out to focus more broadly on some key lessons learned from
implementing decentralization policies.
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a wide range of technical issues and tools, is essentially
part of a highly, and sometimes volatile, political process.
Decentralization embraces a variety of stakeholders,
primarily within the public sector, and is aimed at
recomposing and rebalancing the interests between
these actors and ultimately their relationships with
their citizens. In practice, rebalancing interests means
bargaining that will eventually redefine command over
public resources, both in revenues and expenditures (cf.
Treisman, 1999; Eaton et al, 2010).
With respect toany government defining its decentralization policy, it is of intrinsic importance to know
and critically analyzewho wants what and why in this
environment. It is particularly important to be aware of
the critical role played by certain stakeholders who are
in a position to influence reforms throughout the implementation process. Unfortunately, this also holds for
assessing different interests within the government itself
(Tidemand, 2010). While a Ministry of Municipal Affairs,
social policy think tanks, and municipal associations may
be strong supporters of decentralization, other bodies
may have the authority to blockor delay reform. Finance
ministries, for example, are predominantly concerned
with controlling overall public finance (and rightly so),
thus contributing to fiscal health and macroeconomic
stability. Consequently, allowing for new revenue and
expenditure authorities at subnational level may be perceived
as jeopardizing this very function. Sector ministries, such as
in education, health and transport, may not wish to share
their power and resources with subnational entities they
regard incapable of executing public tasks.
In some cases, governments in developing countries
have simply been interested in providing new options
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for political participation and integration instead of critically and financially evaluating the different options
for improving public service delivery. In other cases,
governments promised the creation of new territorial
units providing internal ‘autonomy’ but became trapped
in endless political battles with and among local interest
groups. Such a pattern seems clear in Ecuador in the late
1990s, for example(Frank, 2007).
From this perspective, policy makers should be aware
of political uncertainties and be prepared to provide a
policy framework that is gradual in nature, which has
been (i) thoroughly discussed with key stakeholders, and
(ii) focuses on a medium-term strategy of implementation, including cost estimates. “Bush fire innovations” in
decentralization may be politically rewarding for some –
and for some time – but are fiscally or administratively
unsustainable in the long term.
Most decentralization policies are accompanied by
some delicate uncertainty about who does what in a more
decentralized environment, i.e. which level of government carries out what function, for what share of public
resources, and how such delegation of functions should
take place over time.This may lead to endless political
debates and a stand still for quite some time (cf. Smoke,
2003; Bahland Martinez-Vazquez, 2006).
Again, we may wish to better understand the rivalry
and the political economy of such reforms. While local
government son the one hand may try to push hard for a
higher share of public resources, they are not necessarily
interested in assuming more functions.Moreover, they
may not be interested in thorough public sector reform
initiatives within their respective jurisdictions either. On
the other hand, regional or local representations of sector
ministries may not be willing to lose their influence, share
resources, and coordinate policies and investments with
the local administrations (cf. Fuhr, 1994; Eaton et al,
2010).
Experience suggests that successful decentralization
may be short-lived or difficult to replicate unless effective
rules for intergovernmental collaboration are put into place.
Macroeconomic management, for example, is still a core
function of central government. In education, higher levels
of government may be needed to prevent fragmentation
and to minimize differences in the quality of education in
different communities (Welsh and McGill, 1999). In the
health sector, the appropriate allocation of responsibilities
across levels of government is rarely clear-cut. Improving
immunization programs, tuberculosis surveillance and
vaccine storage all requirestrong effective management
athigher levels of government. In addition, localities may
not provide the right framework for policy formulation
and implementation (Berman and Bossert, 2000).
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Consequently, the impetus should not be to rigidly
push functions down to communities and municipalities, artificially separating levels of government, but
finding the right balance between the roles of different
governmental levels to ensure that high-quality services
are provided in a timely and cost-effectivemanner.
The overall objective of decentralization is to delegate
functions to the level of government that can most effectively administer them, and to provide the necessary
financial resources, usually in a combination of transfers,
revenue-sharing and matching grants mechanisms with
the central government, together witha set of authorities to raise revenues locally (Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld,
2009). Part of this debate islinked to the European discussion
on‘subsidiarity’ - a normative concept in which the lowest
level of government is selected to perform services, unless
a higher level can demonstrate doing so more efficiently
or more effectively.
Since the decentralization process results in an
increase inthe number of actors and budgetary accounts,
the countries embarking on decentralization that are
already facing budgetary and inflationary pressures are
confronted with additional challenges and risks.
Intergovernmental fiscal relations mainly affect the
macroeconomic conditions through three major channels:
the assignment and sharing of tax bases and expenditures;
the matching of tax and expenditure decisions; and the
regulation of sub national borrowing levels. Each channel
provides a specific set of incentives for government decision makers (Boadway and Shah, 2009).
Serious macroeconomic imbalances can occur if major
tax bases are inappropriately assigned. For example, in
India during the 1990s important tax bases were assigned
to subnational governments, while the central government with its growing public debt and pension liabilities,
had but a small and inefficient tax base consisting mainly
of income, foreign trade, and excise taxes. The sharing
of major tax bases also has the potential to reduce the
magnitude of deficit reduction at the central government
level. This happened in Argentina in the early 1990s
when tax reform led to increased tax revenues that had to
be shared with provincial governments. The provincial
governments essentially took a free ride on the tax-raising
efforts of the central government and used the extra
revenue to expand their civil service. The overall result
was rapid subnational expenditure expansion that contributed
significantly to Argentina’s economic and fiscal crisis in the
early 2000s (Dillinger and Webb, 1999a).
Expenditures with national benefits and costs – national
public goods – are typically the responsibility of the
central government. These include the costs of economic
stabilization and redistribution. But some local expendi-
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tures may affect income distribution, such as residential
zoning regulations and the provision of health and housing
subsidies in developing countries. Since the benefits of
local public expenditures tend to be concentrated in the
jurisdiction of subnational government andthe costs are
spread across the nation, subnational governments have a
greaterincentive to spend beyond their means and to shift
the financing costs to other governments.
In many countries (particularly in Latin America)
democratization has resulted in an increase in the amount
of resources under subnational control and the degree of
local autonomy in their use, such that local governments
in Latin America today often account for almost half of
total public spending. Although decentralization has shifted
resources downward, there has been no corresponding clarification and expansion of local responsibilities - for example,
Colombia in the 1990s (Echavarría et al, 2002). Subnational
governments were often not willing to assume new tasks and
were not required to perform specific functions, nor were they
prohibited from performing functions already performed
by other levels of government. As a result, local governments used much of their wind fall to increase staff levels and
launch questionable new infrastructure projects (Dillinger
and Webb, 1999b).
Thus, as a means of achieving its objectives, fiscal
decentralization must be accompanied by a corresponding
decentralization of expenditure responsibilities, the institutional capacities of state and municipal governmentsneed
to be improved, and the federal government must impose
hard budget constraintson its fiscal and financial relationships with sub national governments.
Borrowing by local governments can contribute to
macroeconomic instability when the central government
fails to impose hard budget constraints and when there is
a lack of effective mechanisms to monitor debt obligations, particularly when multiple lenders are involved (cf.
Schwarcz, 2002).
There is also the problem of asymmetric information
between borrowers (subnational governments) and lenders
(central government and international capital markets).
In China, for example, provincial governments were
prohibited by law from running budget deficits and from
financing them through borrowing. But in the early
1990s, all but uncontrolled borrowing by state enterprises at
the subnational level (making deals with provincial governments) contributed to economic overheating, putting
overall stability at risk. In the late 1990s, Brazilian stateshad accumulated a national debt exceeding US$100
billion, close to the levels of total federal and central bank
debt. In 2009, subnational debt still accounted for some
30 percent of total public sector net debt in Brazil, and the
debt of Indian states forsome 27 percent of GDP (Canuto
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and Liu, 2010).
Unless the growth of debt can be curtailed, the federal
government will have to reduce its own spending, raise
taxes, or resort to inflationary financing to cover subnational indebtedness.Therefore, since the early 2000s,
‘fiscal responsibility pacts’ between national and sub
national governments have been enacted in many countries as a mechanism for monitoring and remedying accumulating fiscal and debt problems (Liu and Webb, 2011).
Economic and financial distortions may also arise
from the ability of subnational governments to exploit
weaknesses at the center. In the absence of agreed intergovernmental rules, local units may benefit from sources
of income (rents) that have not been formally allocated to
themunder an appropriate fiscal decentralization scheme.
During the 1990s, for example, the development of
self-government at the local level in Poland saw many
local authorities beginning to act like pressure groups,
with a propensity to extract more benefits from the
government for their local clienteles. As a consequence,
inequalities have risen among jurisdictions, leading to
new forms of social conflict (World Bank, 1992).
In Pakistan (during the late 1990s) decentralization was accompanied by the subtle politicization of
intergovernmental relationships. Provincial governments, which have expanded their roles in the provision
of education and other local public services since the
1960s, have increasingly adopted an intrusive, centralist
behavior towards municipal governments. Instead of
being encouraged to assume new tasks and responsibilities, municipal governments were being denied opportunities to succeed, while Pakistan’s intermediate level of
government were benefiting from a half way approach to
decentralization (cf. Cheema et al, 2003).
A much more serious – and more general – problem
is the lack of local accountability and the constraints to
citizen participation. Local elites can capture the benefits
of decentralization and easily use newly assigned revenue
and expenditure authorities for their own purposes. Thus,
the likelihood of corruption practices, biased spending,
misallocation of resources, and collusion with suppliers
increasing in quality and quantity is even higher (cf. for a
more detailed reflection Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002).
The case of Aceh, Indonesia illustrates this point clearly.
In 2006, local government in Aceh received revenues five
times higher than before decentralization in 1999. Moreover, there was a massive inflow of other public resources
including the US$ 8 billion tsunami reconstruction funds.
Local government institutions, however, lacked the
capacity to effectively manage and spend these resources.
With little political competition, corruption became widespread. Government expenditure continued to neglect the
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rural poor and focused attention instead on urban centers,
where resources were captured by politically wellconnected elites (Barron and Clark, 2006).
National equality in living standards and access to public
services is an over arching goal in many countries – at times,
even a constitutional mandate, like in Germany. Centralization allows the national government greater discretion
incountering regional income disparities by managing
regional differences in levels of public service provision and taxation. Under decentralization, however, equal
outcomes can no longer be guaranteed, or at least, may be
difficult to achieve. And relatively powerful and wealthier
local governments and regions may disproportionately
benefit from being given greater taxing and spending
powers.
In India, for example, per capita incomes in one of
its richer states, Haryana, is almost five times greater
compared to one of its poorer states, Bihar. In China,
provincial disparities in per capita incomes have been
steadily increasing in the last two decades. Per capita
income (in 2010 PPP) in one of the richer provinces,
Guangdong, is now four times greater than that in one
of the poorest provinces, Guizhou. Most provinces on
the eastern and southern coast, such as Hainan, Fujian,
Jiangsu and Liaoning have done much better in terms
of income growth than the western, interior provinces,
largely because of their central location,good transportation and communication links,and their proximity to Hong
Kong. These natural advantages have been reinforced by
official policies that favor coastal provinces, including
many tax incentives to foreign investors locating in the
special economic zones near the coast, large allocations
of credit (pro ratato population) through China’s government-directed banking system, and registration requirements that actively discourage the poor from migrating to
the booming cities on the coast.
European experiences indicate, however, that decentralization per se does not necessarily lead to higher (or
lower) levels of income inequality. The impact of decentralization on the distribution of income may be largely
determined by the internal structures of inequality within
regions. Poor regions, therefore, may not always prefer
centralization to decentralization and rich regions may
not always opt for decentralization (Beramendi, 2003).
Decentralization policies often run into difficulties
because the organizational and institutional capacities and
performance at subnational levels are still too weak. Given
historical circumstances, there is great need to upgrade
human resources and financial management along with
the quality of local service provision, as well aspromote
the joint participation of citizens and the private sector
in the formulation of adequate local development strate-
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gies. Without such improvements, it appears unlikely that
local governments can assume their new responsibilities
and new tasks effectively and efficiently (Wunsch, 2001;
World Bank, 2005).
In the real world, however, decentralization policiescannot wait until such a process is completed. Instead, the
delegation of functions needs to get started while capacity
is still being developed ‘on the run’.
In light ofthe previously mentioned pitfalls of decentralization, probably the most important objective in
capacity developmentis to ensure that additional financial
resources are managed soundly. This is partly, but not
exclusively, a technical and training issue. In most cases,
better fiscal management and transparency of local policy
making has resulted not from financial management
tools alone, but from upgrading citizen voice and choice
options, and through better accountability (cf. contributions in Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007).
Similar to our arguments related to the capturing trap
where public office is contested and people can participate and decide on representatives at different levels of
government, the number of political choices citizens
can make also increases, thus stimulating competition
between governments. Local participation can also mean
greater confidence in and acceptance of policy decisions
by constituents. In many countries, citizen participation
has played a crucial role in monitoring local government’s
performance, ensuring that governments do what they are
supposed to do in a timely and cost-efficient manner (cf.
Eckardt, 2009).
Clearly, besides investment in training and technical
equipment, increased local participation has provided important incentives for decision makers to adopt innovative strategies in administration and management (Campbell and Fuhr,
2004).
In essence, for local capacity building strategies to
achieve their objectives, the question of adverse incentive structures in the overall public sector needs to be
tackled as well. For example, as long as top-down political bargaining yields good results, or “easy” finance is
available to local governments, local decision makers
may not be fully motivated to get into the (politically
delicate) business of reforming their public institutions
(Fuhr, 1994).
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this articlehas shown that
decentralization can be part of a strategy to improve the
capability and effectiveness of the state. It encompasses
mechanisms that increase openness and transparency,
strengthen incentives for participation in public affairs,
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and where appropriate, bring government closer to the
people and to the communities it is meant to serve. Such
reform, however, also carries some serious risks.
Upgrading public sector capabilities at all levels of
government will take time and requires paying close
attention to the potential dangers: there is a risk that
efforts to open up government to a broader array of needs
and interests will not improve effectiveness or accountability if they tend to shut out other groups further.
But the experience of governments the world over
suggests some clear starting points: First, work to ensure
broad-based public discussion and evaluation of key
policy directions and priorities. This means making information available in the public interest and establishing
consultative mechanisms such as advisory councils,
deliberation councils, and citizen committees to gather
the views and preferences of affected groups.
Second, encourage, where feasible, the direct participation of users and beneficiary groups in the design,
implementation, and monitoring of local public goods
and services. Enhance the capacity and efficiency of local
organizations and institutions rather than replace them.
Third, where appropriate, adopt a carefully staged or
sectoral approach to decentralization in priority areas.
Introduce strong monitoring mechanisms and make sure
that sound intergovernmental rules (and vertical incentives) are in place to restrain arbitrary action at central
and local levels.
Fourth, at the local level, focus on the processes (and
horizontal incentives) for building accountability and competition. Where local governments are weakly accountable and
unresponsive, improving both horizontal and vertical
accountability will be a vital first step to achieving higher
state capability.
There are always some dangers inherent in a strategy
of greater openness through decentralization. Creating
more opportunities for voice and participation gives rise
to an increase in the level of demands made on the state,
which can in turn increase the risk of gridlock or capture
by vocal interest groups. And if there are no clear-cut
rules to impose restraints on different tiers of government and incentives to encourage local accountability,
the crisis of governance that afflicts many centralized
governments will simply be passed down to lower levels,
and may increase political instability.
Such obstacles on the path to decentralization are not
insurmountable. The first step towards decentralization is
making the objectives of reform clearly intelligible to citizens and the business community. Such communication
and consensus-building will reap a double benefit. Not
only willthe support for reform increase, the government
will be armed with a better sense of how to do it right.
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